BYU Law Review
Volume 1994 | Issue 2

5-1-1994

Cheers! A Tribute to Justice Byron R. White
John Paul Stevens

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview
Part of the Judges Commons, and the Legal Biography Commons
Recommended Citation
John Paul Stevens, Cheers! A Tribute to Justice Byron R. White, 1994 BYU L. Rev. 208 (1994).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview/vol1994/iss2/1

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Brigham Young University Law Review at BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in BYU Law Review by an authorized editor of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

Article 1

"Cheers!"
A Tribute to Justice Byron R. White
John Paul Stevens*
Chief Justice Rehnquist likes to test law clerks' knowledge
of trivia by asking them to list all of the Supreme Court
Justices whose names are colors. Although few remember all
five, the names of Hugo Black and Byron White always come
readily to mind.' The links between those two great names
shed light on Justice White's unique contributions to the
Supreme Court, and help to explain his unparalleled knowledge
of the traditions of the Court.
The year 1937 was notable for both men. In the fall of
1937, Hugo Black became the 77th member of the Court.
Although his appointment was particularly significant because
it was President Roosevelt7s first, it was probably less
newsworthy than the exploits of the man who was destined to
join him on the bench twenty-five years later. For 1937 was the
season in which one of football's all-time greats made one
sensational play after another, averaging thirty-one yards on
his punt returns, punting the ball eighty-four yards without a
roll, and running and passing for more offensive yardage than
any other player in the college game. Byron White was not only
a star on offense, whether carrying the ball, passing it, or
blocking for a teammate, but also a great defensive player.
Unlike today's stars, who exhibit flashes of brilliance at
specialized tasks for a few minutes at a time, he regularly
played the full sixty minutes of each game. He was just as
effective in the last minute as in the first.
The character of White's career as a Justice has been
remarkably similar. His judicial skills, like his athletic skills,

* Associate Justice, Supreme Court of the United States.
1. The other three Justices are Horace Gray, Henry Billings Brown, and
Edward Douglass White. Justice White is also one of the twelve Justices (or
fourteen, if Justices Clarke and Clark are counted) with the same surname as
another Justice. The others are Rutledge, Marshall, Harlan, Jackson and Lamar.
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are exceptional and diverse. He is decisive, independent,
articulate and uncommonly intelligent. He is diligent, thorough
and cooperative, always discharging his responsibilities
promptly and carrying more than his share of the Court's
workload. Moreover, his skills were just as effective when he
retired in 1993 as when he came t o the Court in 1962. He was
a regular sixty-minute team player during his entire career.
Justice White unquestionably has more first-hand
knowledge about the internal workings of the Supreme Court
and character of its Justices than any other living person. At
the time of his retirement, there had been only 106 members of
the Court. He was the 93rd, and of course worked closely with
each of the next thirteen appointees as well as with the
brethren he joined in 1962. Moreover, while serving as a law
clerk t o Chief Justice Vinson during the October 1946 Term, he
wrote memoranda about in forma pauperis petitions that were
regularly reviewed by a Court whose most senior member,
Justice Black, was its 77th Justice. He thus had a working
relationship with well over a quarter of the judges2 who have
. ~ relationship with Justice Black,
ever served on the C ~ u r tHis
which began during Byron's clerkship and was renewed after
his appointment to the Court, is especially significant, because
it made Justice White privy to oral traditions that date back to
Black's appointment in 1937.
In 1937, shortly after Justice Black received his
commission, a defendant who had been sentenced to death in
Connecticut tried to persuade the Court that any action that
"would be a violation of the original bill of rights (Amendments
I t o VIII) if done by the federal government is now equally
unlawful by force of the Fourteenth Amendment if done by a
state."4 With only Justice Butler noting a dissent, the Court
rejected that categorical submission. In his opinion for the
Court, Justice Cardozo recognized that "the domain of liberty,

2. Although some of my colleagues prefer the statutory term "Justice," I
have always thought it fitting to use the title selected by the framers of Article
111. Moreover, Justice Frankfurter, perhaps the best informed student of the history
of the Court, described us as "judges." See, e.g., Adamson v. California, 332 U.S.
46, 62 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
3. Justices Black, Douglas and Franarter were on the Court when Justice
White was a law clerk and also when he became a Justice. The only two Justices
appointed after those three with whom Byron did not serve were Justice Minton
and Justice Whittaker, whom Byron succeeded.
4. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U S . 319, 323 (1937).
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withdrawn by the Fourteenth Amendment from encroachment
by the states" had been "enlarged by latter-day judgments to
include liberty of the mind as well as liberty of action,'" but
concluded that it did not embrace the double jeopardy claim
asserted by the defendant, Palko. Although the specific holding
in that case has been superseded by additional "latter-day
judgments," reliance on the judicial process to define the
contours of the domain of liberty protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment has survived.
That approach has, however, been subjected t o serious
criticism. Ironically, despite the fact that Justice Black had
joined the Palko opinion, it was he who became its strongest
and most effective critic. It was in the 1946 Term of the Court,
while Byron White was clerking for the Chief Justice, that
Justice Black wrote his famous dissent in Adamson v.
Calif~rnia,~
expressly endorsing the thesis that the petitioner
had advanced in Palko. His analysis of the legislative history of
the Fourteenth Amendment had convinced him that it was
specifically intended to incorporate the entire Bill of Rights.'
At the same time, he rejected any effort by the judiciary to give
a different or more expansive reading to the Fourteenth
Amendment's guarantee of "liberty." His disapproval of the
Court's earlier use of "substantive due process" to invalidate
progressive legislation had convinced him that judges should
stay out of the business of trying t o define the concept of
liberty.'
The three other opinions in Adamson illustrate different
approaches t o defining that concept. For Justice Reed, who
wrote for the majority, the fact that the Court had already held
that the Fifth Amendment's protection against giving testimony
by compulsion did not apply in state trialss was a sufficient
basis for rejecting Adamson's similar claim.'' One can read
that opinion as accepting the judge-made common law of the

5. Id. at 327.
6. 332 U.S. at 68.
7. Id. at 71-72, 74-75 (Black, J., dissenting). The appendix t o Justice Black's
opinion summarizes the relevant history. Id. at 92 (Black, J., dissenting). It
adequately explains the grant of power to Congress in $ 5 of the Amendment, but
seems to me to fall short of demonstrating that there was an express intent to
make the entire Bill of Rights binding on the states without enabling legislation.
8. See id. at 79-84 (Black, J., dissenting).
9. Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 99-114 (1908).
10. See Adurnson, 332 U.S. a t 52-54.
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eighteenth century, but agreeing with Justice Black's view that
the concept of liberty as then defined should not be enlarged by
the judicial process. At the other extreme was Justice Murphy's
dissent, endorsing Justice Black's conclusion that "the specific
guarantees of the Bill of Rights should be carried over intact
into the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment," but
disagreeing with his view that those specifics marked the outer
limit of the Amendment's protection.l1
Justice Franfirter expressed an intermediate position in
his concurring opinion. Relying heavily on the views of the
"forty-three judges" who sat on the Court during the seventy
years after the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, he
firmly rejected Justice Black's position and adhered t o the view
that the Amendment "inescapably imposes upon this Court an
exercise of judgment upon the whole course of the proceedings
in order t o ascertain whether they offend those canons of
decency and fairness which express the notions of justice of
English-speaking peoples even toward those charged with the
most heinous offense^."^^ His conclusion in the particular case
was adverse to the defendant, but his approach, unlike Justice
Black's, recognized the importance of providing protection
against abuses other "than those which had become manifest in
1791."13
When Justice White joined the Court in 1962, this debate
about the method of defining the domain of liberty protected by
the Fourteenth Amendment was still very much alive-as,
indeed, it is today. Justice White quickly made his own mark
on the proceedings. His contributions to the debate have been
much too significant to be evaluated fully in a single article.
Nevertheless, two observations may be appropriate before
turning to certain other aspects of his work.
A wealth of cases attest to Justice White's refusal t o
imprison the concept of liberty in eighteenth century legal

11. Id. at 124 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
12. Id. at 62, 67-68 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
13. Id. at 67 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
As judges charged with the delicate task of subjecting the government of
a continent to the Rule of Law wc must be particularly mindful that it is
"a constitution we are expounding," so that it should not be imprisoned in
what are merely legal forms even t.hough they have the sanction of the
Eighteenth Century.
Id. at 66 (Franldurter, J., concurring).
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forms. His opinion in Griswold v. Connecticut,14 for instance,
squarely and correctly rested its conclusion that the statutory
prohibition against t h e u s e of contraceptives w a s
unconstitutional on the Liberty Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.15 Like Justice Harlan in G r i s ~ o l d , ' ~a n d
Justice Frankfurter in Adanson, Justice White expressly
rejected Justice Black's view that the substantive content of the
Liberty Clause is limited to the guarantees in the Bill of
Rights. l7
In other contexts, as well, Justice White was among the
first to identify and condemn arbitrary official conduct. In
a r e a s a s diverse a s prison administration,'' school
discipline,lg public e m p l ~ ~ r n e nand
t ~ ~ the regulation of

14. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
15. "In my view this C o ~ e c t i c u tlaw as applied to married couples deprives
them of 'liberty' without due process of law, as that concept is used in the
Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 502 (White, J., concurring in judgment). His
opinion rested primarily on Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), and Pierce v.
Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
Despite the fact that the prohibition against the use of contraceptives in the
papal encyclical Humanae Vitae is still supported by highly respected authority,
none of the opinions in Griswold mentions the encyclical as the probable
explanation for what Justice Stewart characterized as "an uncommonly silly law."
381 U.S. at 527 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
16. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 499 (Harlan, J., concurring in judgment).
17. Justice White explained in a footnote that
[dlissenting opinions assert that the liberty guaranteed by the Due
Process Clause is limited to a guarantee against unduly vague statutes
and against procedural unfairness a t trial. Under this view the Court is
without authority to ascertain whether a challenged statute, or its
application, has a permissible purpose and whether the manner of
regulation bears a rational or justifying relationship to this purpose. A
long line of cases makes very clear that this has not been the view of
this Court.
Id. at 504, n.* (White, J., concurring in judgment).
18. Writing for the Court in Wolff v. M c D o ~ e l l ,418 U.S. 539, 555-57 (1974),
Justice White stated,
But though his rights may be diminished by the needs and exigencies of
the institutional environment, a prisoner is not wholly stripped of
constitutional protections when he is imprisoned for crime. There is no
iron curtain drawn between the Constitution and the prisons of this
country. . . . We also reject the assertion of the State that whatever may
be true of the Due Process Clause in general or of other rights protected
by that Clause against state infringement; the interest of prisoners in
disciplinary procedures is not included in that "liberty" protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment.
19. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574 (1975) ("The Due Process Clause also
forbids arbitrary deprivations of liberty. Where a person's good name, reputation,
honor, or integrity is at stake because of what the government is doing to him,'
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automobile safety:'
Justice White insisted on fair and
rational treatment by the government." His opinion for the
Court in Stanley u. Illinoisz3 afforded constitutional protection
to an unmarried father's interest in his child. More recently,
his dissenting opinion in Michael H. v. Gerald D.'* rejected
the traditional, narrow approach to the rights of an unmarried
father.25
At the same time, however, Justice White's opinions, like
those of Justices Harlan, Frankfurter, and Cardozo,
demonstrate a conviction that the judicial power to define the
concept of liberty is not open-ended. His evaluation of the state
interests supporting abortion regulation^:^ the prohibition of
sodomy,2' and the bizarre zoning regulation invalidated in
Moore u. City of East C l e ~ e l a n d :persuaded
~
him that those
deprivations of liberty were constitutional. Regardless of
whether "latter-day judgments" ultimately confirm or reject his
particular conclusions in those cases, his method of analysis
remained faithful to the approach that other great judges have

the minimal requirements of the Clause must be satisfied." (citing Wisconsin v.
Constantineau, 430 U.S. 433, 437 (1971))); see also Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S.
651, 692-700 (1977) (White, J., dissenting).
20. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985); Bishop v.
Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 360-61 (1976) (White, J., dissenting). Moreover, he has
consistently voted to protect public employees from discrimination on account of
their political affiliation. Rutan v. Republican Party, 497 U.S. 62 (1990); Branti v.
Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980); Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976).
21. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of the United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
22. Although I shall not otherwise comment on Justice White's important
opinions construing the First Amendment, I note that he agreed with Justice
Black's conclusion in the Pentagon Papers case, New York Times Co. v. United
States, 403 U.S. 713, 730 (1971) (White, J., concurring), while rejecting his purely
textual analysis of the Amendment.
23. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
24. 491 U.S. 110, 157 (1989).
25. There is an interesting parallel between the several opinions in that case
and those in Adamson. Footnote 6 of Justice Scalia's opinion, joined by the Chief
Justice, id. at 127, takes the same approach as Justice Reed's Court opinion, while
the separate opinion of Justice O ' C o ~ o r ,joined by Justice Kennedy, id. at ,132
(O'Comor, J., concurring in part), is like Justice Frankfurter's in that it refuses to
foreclose unanticipated future developments in the law. The dissenters' views are,
of course, closest to those expressed by Justice Murphy in Adamson. Id. at 136
( B r e ~ a n J.,
, dissenting).
26. See Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476
U S . 747, 785, 795 (1986) (White, J., dissenting).
27. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
28. 431 U.S. 494, 541 (1977) (White,J., dissenting).
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followed in the continuing effort to understand the concept of
liberty.
A similar acceptance of judicial responsibility tempered by
a healthy respect for other branches of government is reflected
in Justice White's opinions construing the Eighth Amendment's
prohibition on the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment.
His explanation in Coker v. Georgiaz9of why a death sentence
is grossly disproportionate and excessive for the crime of raping
an adult woman first carefully reviewed relevant state
statutesS0and the sentencing decisions of juries in comparable
cases:'
but ultimately concluded that "the Constitution
contemplates that in the end our own judgment will be brought
to bear on the question of the acceptability of the death penalty
While he has joined opinions
under the Eighth A~nendment."~~
according the states broad latitude in administering capital
p u n i ~ h m e n tJustice
,~~
White also cast one of the five votes in
Furman v. Georgia34 t o invalidate the then-prevalent,
open-ended statutory procedures for administering the death
penalty:5 and his Court opinion in Enmund u. FloridaS6
established that such punishment must be tailored to the
defendant's "personal responsibility and moral guilt." Perhaps
most significantly, his recent dissenting opinion in Harmelin u.
Michigan3' contains an effective refutation of two Justices'

29. 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
30. Id. at 593-96.
31. Id. at 596-97.
32. Id. at 597.
33. See Johnson v. Texas, 113 S. Ct. 2658 (1993); Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S.
137 (1987).
34. 408 U.S. 238, 310 (1972).
35. His reasoning may provide important guidance in some future review of
this still-troublesome issue. After noting that the death penalty had "not been
considered cruel and unusual punishment in the constitutional sense because it
was thought justified by the social ends it was deemed to serve," he continued:
At the moment that it ceases realistically to further these purposes,
however, the emerging question is whether its imposition in such
circumstances would violate the Eighth Amendment. It is my view that it
would, for its imposition would then be the pointless and needless
extinction of life with only marginal contributions to any discernible social
or public purposes. A penalty with such negligible returns to the State
would be patently excessive and cruel and unusual punishment violative
of the Eighth Amendment.
Id. at 312.
36. 458 U.S. 782, 801 (1982).
37. 111 S. Ct. 2680, 2709 (1991).
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remarkable argument that proportionality should play no part
in the Court's Eighth Amendment analysis.
Justice White's Fourteenth and Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence does not, of course, begin to exhaust his
contribution t o the Court's case law. The depth and diversity of
Justice White's understanding of the work of the Supreme
Court is difficult to describe. He paid particular attention t o
the cases on the Court's original docket that seldom receive
public notice. His expertise in jurisdictional matters, water
rights, communications law, voting rights and a variety of other
issues was exceptional. In his construction of statutes, he
carefully reviewed and evaluated the relevant legislative
history.3g Indeed, he was prepared to defend the use of
legislative history against those who questioned its value,
explaining that "common sense suggests that inquiry benefits
from reviewing additional information rather than ignoring
it.2239

While Justice White's contributions t o the Court are fairly
reflected in his extensive written opinions, other aspects of his
work are less well known. He brought a concentrated attention,
and a special style, to our day-to-day labors, both of which will
be sorely missed.
One of the most striking features of Justice White's
approach to the Court's daily operations was his unique focus
on the discretionary certiorari docket. I believe that Justice
White treated the Court's participation in the legislative
history of the Judges' Bill-the 1925 statute giving the Court
discretionary jurisdiction over most of its docket4%s a
commitment to Congress that if the Bill were enacted, the
Court would give careful, individualized scrutiny t o every
certiorari petition that might thereafter be filed? His own
38. See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S.265, 379
(1978) (opinion of White, J.).
39. Wisconsin Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 111 S. Ct. 2476, 2485 n.4 (1991).
Justice White went on to note:
Legislative history materials are not generally so misleading that jurists
should never employ them in a good faith effort to discern legislative
intent. Our precedents demonstrate that the Court's practice of utilizing
legislative history reaches well into its past. We suspect that the practice
will likewise reach well into the future.
Id. (citation omitted).
40. The Judiciary Act of 1925, 43 Stat. 936.
41. I have described relevant portions of that legislative history in my article
about the Rule of Four. See John Paul Stevens, The Lifespan of a Judge-Made
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thorough review of those petitions each week was certainly
consistent with the conscientious fulfillment of such an
obligation. Justice White regularly identified more petitions for
discussion a t conference than any other Associate Justice, and
his frequent published dissents from orders denying certiorari
demonstrate the depth of his concern about the discharge of
our responsibility.
Those published dissents, however, tell only part of the
story. What they do not reveal is the significant number of
occasions on which a draft dissent from denial of certiorari
remained unpublished, because it actually persuaded one or
more of Justice White's colleagues to change a vote from a
"deny" to a "grant." Often, then, it was Justice White's
unpublished eloquence that was responsible for a grant of
certiorari, and with it, the reversal of an unjust conviction or
an incorrect interpretation of a federal statute. While I have
adhered to a contrary practice, and refrained from circulating
dissents from denial of certiorari:'
I must acknowledge that
Justice White's successes in this area are a strong argument
for the value of such dissents.
Justice White enjoyed oral arguments. As was apparent to
everyone present, he had a complete mastery of the controlling
issues of argued cases. When a petitioner's oral presentation
relied on a theory that differed from the written brief, Justice
White could be expected to identify that difference in his
questioning of counsel. Similarly, when a respondent put forth
a new reason for affirming, the Justice typically would ask
whether counsel was prepared to defend the rationale adopted
by the court below. His questions were usually terse-an
apparent gruffness often masking a subtle wit-but
they
inevitably revealed his perceptive and thorough preparation.
In the 1946 Term, when Byron was a law clerk, draft
opinions were mechanically produced in the Court's own print
shop. When a draft was completed, the author would distribute
one copy to each Justice. Sometimes the receiving Justice
would ask his law clerk (each Associate Justice had just one
clerk) for comments on the draft; more frequently, if he was
satisfied with it, the Justice would simply return the draft t o

Rule, 58 N.Y.U.L. REV.1, 14-16 (1983).
42. See Singleton v. Commissioner, 439 U.S. 940, 942 (1978) (opinion of
Stevens, J., respecting the denial of certiorari).
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its author with the hand-written message, "Please join me,"
noted on the draft itself.
The print shop has been replaced by the computer, and
single copies and single law clerks have been replaced by
multiple copies and multiple law clerks. Prompt and direct
responses from joining Justices to authors are now less
frequent. Suggestions for improvements, with copies to the
entire Court, as well as a reluctance to join until others have
responded, have sometimes produced delays much longer than
any occasioned by the now-obsolete printing presses. Even the
"please join me" formula seems anachronistic, appearing as it
now does in a separate letter omitting the object of the
sentence.
Nevertheless, Justice White, like other of the most senior
members of the Court, has maintained some of the traditions of
the past. He generally responded to opinion drafts quickly and
straightforwardly, joining without reservation when he was in
general agreement with the authoring Justice. And while
younger Justices now tend to reply to drafts with more
grammatically correct comments such as "I would be pleased to
join your opinion," Justice White still used the traditional
"please join me" when he endorsed the dissent he asked me to
write in the Court's most recent misadventure in the land of
antitrust.43
Traditionally, the release of a Court opinion is preceded by
a n oral announcement by its author. Chief Justice Burger, who
was responsible for many changes that made the Court a
happier and more efficient work-place-ranging from Xerox
copiers and word processors to hall carpeting and a bench
reshaped to enable the two most junior Justices to see and hear
each other during oral argukents-considered those oral
statements a waste of valuable time. Accordingly, he would
merely announce the number or name of the case and the fact
that the judgment had been affirmed or reversed. Justice
White, unlike most other members of the Court, shared the
Chiefs views and followed his practice for several yews. At the
43. See Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 113 S. Ct.
2578 (1993) (affirming setting aside of jury verdict for plaintiff in antitrust case);
id. at 2598 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice White and I privately shared the
opinion that Brooke Group was a case that would not only have been decided
differently by the Court he joined in 1962, but most likely would have been
unanimous as well. A jury verdict commanded more respect from the Court then
than it does today.
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very end of his career, however, he made an unforgettable
impression on the rest of us by returning to his original
practice and announcing his opinions from the bench. While
most oral announcements consist of reading from a prepared
text with the arid flavor of a syllabus, Byron spoke
extemporaneously with the clarity, simplicity, and charm that
characterizes the most effective advocate.
While I was already well acquainted with Justice White's
charm, having first met him during World War I1 when we
both served in the Navy, it was during my first Term on the
Court that Byron taught me how persuasive he can be. I was
assigned the task of preparing the majority opinion in Buffalo
Forge Co. v. United steelworker^:^ a case presenting the
question whether a federal court could enjoin a sympathy
strike pending an arbitrator's decision as to whether it violated
the no-strike clause in the parties' collective bargaining
agreement. After I prepared what I thought was an
unanswerable draft, Byron wrote a dissent that was not only
an adequate answer, but also sufficiently persuasive to change
the outcome of the case. Nor was that the only time that I
authored a proposed majority opinion that eventually became a
dissent from an opinion of the Court announced by Justice
White. Indeed, his practice of writing dissents that turned into
majorities persisted into his last Terms as an active Justice.
Byron was equally effective in the conferences that I
attended. As a relatively senior Justice, he was one of the first
to speak, and usually did so without any notes, always stating
the issues fairly and accurately. Typically, his position in the
case was both firm and unambiguous. On rare occasions,
however, he expressed a willingness t o join a majority for
either result, believing that a clear ruling on the legal issue
was more important than the outcome in the particular case.
More rarely still, he stated his intent to reexamine the case in
the light of what might be written by those firmly committed to
one position or another. Even without such an expression at
conference, Justice White always was willing to listen, and
never hesitated to acknowledge that further study had changed
his mind. Obviously, that was not a frequent occurrence, but
his candor on those rare occasions was both memorable and
admirable.
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Our work involves a great deal of correspondence, usually
hand-delivered with copies for each member of the Court. Some
of those letters are detailed discussions of debatable points in a
circulating draft opinion; some are nothing more than routine
votes on noncontroversial issues. Occasionally, they concern
personal matters, such as a plan to recognize a forthcoming
birthday with an appropriate toast. In Byron's case, such an
occasion was doubly significant, because it also gave us an
opportunity to express our affection for his wife, Marion, whose
birthday is the same as his.
The internal letters that Byron circulated would often
conclude with the one word, "Cheers." While that word always
conveyed a warm and friendly message, it occurs to me that it
also accurately describes my appraisal of Byron's entire
magnificent career. Despite our differences on a variety of
issues of varying importance, when he first told me of his
intent to retire, my immediate, spontaneous, and heartfelt
response was t o urge him not to do so. The decision having
been made, however, I have only this t o say: "Cheers."

Warren E. Burger*
I was a colleague of Byron White for seventeen years on
the Supreme Court, and during that period we agreed far more
than we disagreed. Since Justice White's retirement, various
persons have been at great pains to classify him as either
"conservative" or "liberal." I have never been quite sure what
the writers or speakers mean in the use of each of those terms.
Reflecting on my seventeen years of almost daily association
with Byron White, however, I look back on some of his opinions
and dissents that would lead me t o reject the idea that he is a
"conservative," notwithstanding his well-established positions
on abortion and other high-profde issues that catch the public's
eye, but are not representative of the Court's work, or that he
is a 'liberal." The term "legal realist" comes more near to
describing him than any of the others.
Byron White's dissent in Mirandu u. Arizona1 is revealing.
The decision in that case was not altogether revolutionary. For
my part, I had always admired the British system of justice
* Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court, 1969-1986; Chairman
of the Commission on the Bicentennial of the Constitution, 1985-1992.
1. 384 U.S.436 (1966).
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and thought their judicial system and professional legal system
were the best in the world. On numerous occasions,
particularly in lectures at law schools, I had advocated that we
adopt the British system of having the arresting police officer
give a warning to the person arrested, which is similar to, but
not precisely, the Miranda warning. I thought that this was
only fair and that it would save a lot of trouble in the long run.
But Miranda went beyond the British rule: so I tended to
agree with Justice White's dissent in that case. In a dozen
years on the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit, I had frequently written dissenting opinions expressing
thoughts similar to those of Justice White in his Miranda
dissent.3
What is especially significant about Justice White's dissent
in Miranda, for what it says about his approach to the law in
general, is his criticism of the majority's methodology. There,
he wrote: "Decisions like these cannot rest alone on syllogism,
metaphysics or some ill-defined notions of natural justice . . . .
[This] Court should not proceed to formulate fundamental
policies based on speculation a10ne.'~He had made the same
point before. In an earlier dissent he criticized the Court for
imposing its own philosophical predilections upon State
legislatures or Congress. I fail to see why the Court deems it
more appropriate to write into the Constitution its own
abstract notions of how best to handle the narcotics problem,
for it obviously cannot match either the States or Congress in
expert ~nderstanding.~

It is probably these of White's views that confound the
academic writers searching for convenient labels. Justice White
was cognizant of his role as an Article I11 judge on the Court t o
decide "cases" and "controversies," not t o expound grand
theories of law as a law professor might; it is useful for
academics t o explore new theories, and that task is best left t o
them.

2. For a comparison of Miranda and the British system, see Judith Hails
Kaci, Confessions: A Comparison of Exclusion Under Miranda in the United States
and Under the Judges' Rule in England, 10 AM. J. CRIM. L. 87 (1982).
3. See, e.g., Frazier v. United States, 419 F.2d 1161, 1171-72, 1176 (D.C.
Cir. 1969) (en banc) (Burger, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
4. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 531-32 (White, J., dissenting).
5. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 689 (1962) (White, J., dissenting).
6. U.S. CONST. art. 111, $ 2.
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I found that Justice White and I were in general
agreement on First Amendment issues. He never overlooked, as
some members of the Court did, the difference between conduct
and speech. This, of course, explains his dissenting vote in the
flag-burning case.? We also generally agreed on separation of
powers issues, although Bowsher v. Synars and Immigration &
Naturalization Service v. Chadhas are notable exceptions. The
case that stands out in this regard is Tennessee Valley
Authority v. Hill,'' the separation of powers overtones of
which are often overlooked. There the Court, joined by Justice
White, reiterated the bedrock principle of judicial restraint
essential to a viable separation of powers:
Our individual appraisal of the wisdom or unwisdom of a
particular course consciously selected by the Congress is to be
put aside in the process of interpreting a statute. Once the
meaning of an enactment i s discerned and i t s
constitutionality determined, the judicial process comes to an
end. . . .
. . . [Iln our constitutional system the commitment to
separation of powers is too fbndamental for us to pre-empt
congressional action by judicially decreeing what accords with
"common sense and the public weal." Our Constitution vests
such responsibilities in the political branches."

Although in applying separation of powers concepts Justice
White sometimes took, in my view, a more "pragmatic"
approach than the Constitution allows, Justice White shared
the view, expressed in Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, that
policy choices were appropriately left to the political branches
of government. In Bowsher, he wrote: "Like the Court, I will
not purport to speak to the wisdom of the policies incorporated
in the legislation the Court invalidates; that is a matter for the
Congress and the Executive . . . ."I2 That view, which Justice
White stated with some frequency, might to some reflect a lack
of "vision." To me, however, it reflects faithfulness to the vision
of our Constitution. Justice White's contributions to the Court
in his thirty-one years of service will be well- and long-

7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
478 U.S. 714 (1986); cf. id. at 759 (White,J., dissenting).
462 U.S. 919 (1983); cf. id. at 967 (White, J., dissenting).
437 U.S. 153 (1978).
Id. at 194-95.
Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 759 (White, J., dissenting).
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remembered, and his steadfastness as a "realist" will be
missed.

William J. Brennan, Jr.'
I am delighted to have the opportunity to add my voice t o
the chorus of tribute that has been lavished upon my dear
friend and colleague Byron White since his retirement from the
Court. While Byron and I disagreed often about the issues, we
remained the closest of friends throughout the more than
twenty-eight years we sat together. I remember fondly my
lunches with Byron at neighborhood restaurants, and the
evenings of dinner and conversation we spent at each other's
homes. I still reminisce about the wonderful party that Marion
and Byron hosted for Mary and me at the Court when I retired.
I view Byron's unfailing friendship over the years, especially in
the face of our not infrequent differences of opinion, as a
testimony t o the Court as an institution and t o Byron White as
an individual.
It is not simply that our disagreements remained cordial
and that we never took them personally. Much more than that,
the give and take was an indispensable part of the process and,
to my mind, always productive. All of us on the Court
benefitted from Byron's meticulous preparation and his clear,
direct presentation of the issues at conference. His positions
were always very well stated; you couldn't ignore them, and I
think the need to respond to his points improved my own
opinions.
This is not to say that Byron and I never found ourselves
on common ground.- We of& did. One need look back no
further than the last day of our final Term together to find an
important example: Byron joined my opinion for the Court in
Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC,' which rejected an equal
protection challenge to the Federal Communications
Commission's minority preference policies. Byron and I also
saw eye to eye in Garcia v. Sun Antonio Metropolitan Transit
Authority: in which the Court held that Congress, consistent
with its power under the Commerce Clause, could extend to
* Associate Justice, Supreme Court of the United States, 1956-1990.
1. 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
2. 469 U.S. 528 (1985), overruling National League of Cities v. Usery, 426
US. 833 (1976).
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San Antonio municipal transit employees the protection of the
wage and hour provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act.
Garcia is remembered for rejecting the "traditional
governmental functions" approach to state regulatory immunity
that had been adopted nine years earlier in National League of
Cities v. Usery? Of course, National League of Cities had itself
overruled the Court's decision still eight years earlier in
Maryland v. WirtzO4I remember a former clerk of his
remarking that Byron's return from the conference in which
the Court decided to hear National League of Cities,
presumably with a view to overrule Wirtz, was one of the very
rare occasions on which the Justice became visibly disturbed
with his colleagues.
The list of cases in which Byron and I found ourselves in
agreement amongst a divided Court could of course continue;
other noteworthy examples include NLRB v. Curtin Matheson
Scientific, Inc.: Frontier0 v. Richardson: and Palmer v.
Thornps~n.~
But the fact remains that we disagreed often, and
not infrequently in the most important and controversial areas.
There are perhaps few more conspicuous examples than
abortion decisions such as Roe v. Wade8 and Thornburgh u.
American College of Obstetricians and gynecologist^.^ Two
other divisive cases that come quickly t o mind are the Court's
5-4 decisions in Bowers v. Hardwick,'' the Georgia sodomy
statute case, and Texas v. Johnson," the flag-burning
decision. Still other important cases where Byron and I held
opposing views are Sherbert u. Verner,12in which I authored

3. 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruling Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968).
Justice White (and Justice Marshall) joined my dissent in National League of
Cities. See 426 US. a t 856.
4. 392 U.S. 183 (1968).
5. 494 U.S. 775 (1990) (holding that the NLRB acted within its discretion in
refusing to adopt a presumption that striker replacement workers oppose the
certified collective-bargaining agent).
6. 411 U.S. 677, 678 (1973) (plurality opinion) (establishing gender as a
suspect classification for purpose of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment).
7. 403 U.S. 217, 240 (1971) (White, J., dissenting) (concluding that the city
council's closing of public pools in Jackson, Mississippi to avoid a desegregation
order was a denial of equal protection).
8. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
9. 476 U.S. 747 (1986).
10. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
11. 491 US. 397 (1989).
12. 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (applying strict scrutiny and invalidating the
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the opinion for the Court and Justice White joined the dissent;
Branzburg v. Hayes,13 where our roles were reversed; and
Washington v. Dauis,14 in which Justice White and I wrote
respectively for the Court and in dissent. I also took issue with
Byron's opinion for the Court in Gaffiey v. Curnming~,'~
which he once described as his favorite case? On these and
so many other occasions, Byron and I were able to "agree to
disagree," maintaining a close and constant friendship through
nearly three decades together on the Court.
For nearly two of those three decades, Byron and I sat next
to each other on the bench, which put me in a particularly
opportune spot to enjoy his sharp wit. Many was the time that
he enlivened a dull session of oral argument with a quip about
an awkward attorney or a tedious case. Byron was often
discrete enough t o pass me a note, but sometimes he simply
leaned over and spoke to me in what he liked to think was a
whisper. Byron never did learn how t o whisper. I also
remember that Byron would address me from time to time as
"Billy," which I must say was an unusual but quite agreeable
moniker. (My good friend Justice Harlan was not so felicitous
when I occasionally slipped and greeted him as "Johnny,"
which would always cause the color to drain from his face.) I
also owe a special debt of gratitude t o Byron for being generous
enough to allow me to purloin one of his secretaries, Mary
Elmore, who has been with me now for almost eleven years.
In the end, no survey of opinions, no collection of
anecdotes, no words of tribute, can N l y capture Justice White's
weighty contribution to the Court and to the country. Byron
served with the utmost integrity and distinction during a
tenure longer than that of all but eight Justices in the history
of the Court. The words President Kennedy spoke upon

government's denial of unemployment benefits based on the applicant's observance
of Saturday Sabbath).
13. 408 U.S. 665 (1972) (holding that the First Amendment does not prevent
a grand jury from compelling news reporters to reveal confidential fads and
sources).
14. 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (requiring proof of intentional discrimination,
notwithstanding a showing of disparate impact, in order for black applicants to the
District of Columbia police department t o sustain a claim under the equal
protection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment).
15. 412 U.S. 735 (1973) (allowing greater deviations from population equality
for state legislative districts than for congressional districts).
16. David Lauter, The Justices List Their Most Menorable Cases, NAT'LL.J.,
Nov. 25, 1985, at 5.
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nominating Justice White to the Court in 1962 are no less true
today-this
rugged individualist from Colorado truly has
"excelled in everything he has attempted."" I trust
"retirement" will give Byron an opportunity to enjoy the same
portion in some new and exciting endeavors, and I wish him
and Marion every happiness.

Harry A. Blackmun*
Because Justice White is the senior among us, he has been
a member of the Court every day that any of the rest of us has
served here. His wisdom and gentle prodding have been of
great assistance. One may not always agree with his conclusions, but those conclusions have been firmly and steadfastly
and confidently held. That, indeed, is the way the system
works and was intended t o work.
We are the better because of his presence among us all
these years. That presence will be sorely missed.

17. Statement by the President upon Appointing Byron White to the Supreme
Court, PUB.PAPERS283, 283 (Mar. 30, 1962).
* Associate Justice, Supreme Court of the United States, 1970-1994.

